State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
3-10-1953
State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners 40 Cal.2d 436 (1953).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/811
) 
436 STATE BOARD v. THRlFT-D-Lux CLEANERS [40 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21666. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
STATE BOARD OF DRY CLEANERS, Appellant, v. 
TIIRlFT-D-Ll~X CLEANERS, INC. (a Corporation) et 
a)., Respondents. 
[1] Constitutional Law-Police Power-Scope.-The police power 
extends to legislation enacted to promote the public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare. 
[2] Id. - Constitutionality of Statutes - Duty to Uphold. - If 
there is a proper legislative purpose, a law enacted to carry 
out that purpose, if not arbitrary or discriminatory, must be 
upheld by the courts. 
[3] Id.-Police Power-Legislative Discretion and Court Review. 
-In exercise of police power the law places limits on the 
Legislature's discretion, and whether there has been a rea-
sonable exercise of this power is a court question. 
r 4] Id.-Police Power-Price Regulation.-Previous enactment of 
statutes for regulation of dry cleaning industry, including 
fire protection, safety devices and safeguards, etc. (see Health 
& Saf. Code, div. 12, pt. 2 j Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, 19; 
Lab. Code, div. 5, pt. 1), furnish support for conclusion that 
they were designed to and do fully protect the public health 
and safety, and that minimum price provisions of the Dry 
Cleaners' Act of 1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567) have 
no function to that end, but constitute an unnecessary and 
unreasonable restriction on the pursuit of private and useful 
business activities. 
(6) Id.-Police Power-Price Regulation.-Dry Cleaners' Act of 
1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567), authorizing the State 
Board of Dry Cleaners to establish minimum price schedules 
for various items of cleaning, dyeing and pressing services, 
cannot be justified as a war or emergency measure, where 
there is nothing in the dry cleaning business which distin-
guishes it frOID the multitude of other businesses offering 
services to the general public, and wh,ere the disturbances 
and violence which existed in the dry cleaning business dur-
ing the period of economic stress prior to W orId War IT 
were common to other businesses. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 108; Am .. Jur., Constitu-
tional Law, § 271. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,12] Constitutional Law, §100; [2] 
Constitutional Law, § 48; [3,7] Constitutional Law, § 107; [4,5, 
13] Constitutional Law, § 104; [6] Constitutional Law, § 105; [8] 
Constitutional Law, § 56; [9-11] Constitutional Law, § 102; [14, 
15] Constitutional Law, § 85. 
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[6] Id.-Police Power-Limitations.-A legislative body may not, 
under the guise of providing for the general welfare, impose 
unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions on the pursuit of 
useful activities. 
[7] Id.-Police Power-Court Review.-If a statute has no real 
or substantial relation to any legitimate police power ob-
jective, it is the duty of the court so to declare. 
[8] Id.-Constitutionality of Statutes-Presumptions.-Every in-
tendment will be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of 
a legislative enactment. 
[9] Id.-Police Power-Occupations.-At least where a business 
is affected with a public interest or clothed with a public use, 
it may be regulated under the general welfare concept. 
[10] Id.-Police Power-Occupations.-The phrase "affected with 
a public interest" does not imply that some particular indus-
tries are and others are not subject to legislative control; 
it means that where the control is for the public good any 
industry may be regulated, provided that there is "adequate 
reason" for it) and such reason can only be to achieve a 
purpose within the police power of the state. 
[11] Id.-Police Power-Occupations.-The "affected with a pub-
lic interest" doctrine is no longer limited to those industries 
in the nature of public utilities. 
[12] Id.-Police Power-General Welfare.-Any legislation to be 
justified and supported by the concept of "general welfare" 
must aim to promote the welfare of a properly classified seg-
ment of the general public, as contrasted with that of a small 
percentage or a special class of the body politic where no 
such classification can be justified. 
[18] Id.-Police Power-Price Regulation.-Dry Cleaners' Act of 
1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567), authorizing the State 
Board of Dry Cleaners to establish minimum price schedules 
for various items of cleaning, dyeing and pressing services, 
is invalid because it is not, by any recognized standard, an 
enactment providing for the public health, safety, morals or 
general welfare; it seeks to establish but a single grade of 
work in the dry cleaning industry and to eliminate the eco-
nomical cleaning job, which a substantial group of the pub-
lic may prefer, and it does not prevent the imposition of 
fraud on the public, nor eliminate destructive and unfair 
competition, which practices are adequately legislated against 
in the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt. 
II, chap. IV). . 
[9] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 111; Am.Jur., Consti-
tutional Law, § 289 et seq. 
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[14] Id.-Delegation of Power-To Administrative Bod7.-While "" 
the delegation of governmental authority to an administra-
tive body is proper in some instances, the delegation of abso-
lute legislative discretion is not, and to avoid such a result 
it is necessary that a delegating statute establish an ascer-
tainable standard to guide the administrative body. 
[16] Id.-Delegation of Power-To Administrative Body.-Dry 
Cleaners' Act of 1945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 9560-9567), au-
thorizing the State Board of Dry Cleaners to establish mini-
mum price schedules for various items of cleaning, dyeing 
and pressing services, is invalid because the attempted delega-
tion of legislation is made to persons directly interel!ted in the 
operation of the regulatory rule, and the penal provisions of 
the statute establish no guide for exercise of the delegated 
authority. 
~~ 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to enjoin violations of Dry Cleaners' Act of 1945. 
Judgment dismissing action on sustaining demurrer to 
amended complaint without leave to amend, affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Alberta Gattone 
and J. Albert Hutchinson, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Appellant. 
Robert Kingsley as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Adele I. Springer for Respondents. 
:;"., 
:~A 
SHENK, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal _. 
after the defendants' general demurrer to the amended com-:~ 
plaint was sustained without leave to amend. The demurrer 
is based on the ground that the minimum price provisions of 
the Dry Cleaners' Act of ]945 (Bus. & Prof. Code, ch. 18, ' 
art. 5, §§ 9560-9567), under which the plaintiff sought in-
junctive relief against the defendant's alleged violations of 
that act, are in violation of the due process clauses of the 
state and federal Constitutions. The ruling on the demurrer 
presents the sole question on appeal. 
The act provides for the creation of a State Board of Dry 
Cleaners consisting of seven members: one from the general 
[14] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 85; Am.Jur., Constitu-
tional Law, § 238 et seq. 
) 
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public; two owners of retail plants; two owners of whole-
sale plants; and two owners of shops. Article 5, in sections 
9560 through 9567, provides for" Minimum Price Schedules." 
Section 9560 empowers the board to act; section 9561 per-
mits the members of the board to have access to cleaning 
establishments; section 9562 provides for rules of procedure, 
notice and hearing. Section 9563 provides: 
"The board may establish minimum price schedules for 
the various items of cleaning, dyeing and pressing services 
for any city or county or other area as may be determined 
by the board upon the filing of a petition with it, request-
ing a minimum price schedule for that . • . area signed by 
seventy-five per cent (75%) or more of the persons in that 
... area who are licensed under this chapter." 
Section 9564 provides: 
"Upon receipt of a petition under this article the board 
shall investigate and ascertain those minimum prices which 
will enable cleaners, dyers, or pressers in that city or county 
or other area to furnish modern, proper, healthful and sani-
tary services, using such appliances and equipment as will 
minimize the danger to public health and safety incident to 
such services. 
"In establishing minimum price schedules, the board shall 
consider all conditions affecting the business of cleaning, 
dyeing and pressing in that city, county, or other area and 
the relation of those conditions to the public health, welfare 
and safety." 
Section 9565 provides that the ·board shall conduct a cost 
survey and states that "the board shall not fix a price for 
any service at a sum less than that which is shown to be 
the cost price of sUch service. . . ." 
Section 9566 provides for the readjustment of minimum 
price levels either on the initiative of the board or on com-
plaint of 51 per cent or more of the persons licensed in the 
area, if the board determines that "the minimum price so 
established or any of them are insufficient properly to pro-
vide healthful and proper services to the public and to main-
tain a clean, healthful, safe and sanitary cleaning, dyeing 
or pressing establishment, or that any minimum price set 
creates an undue hardship on any licensee under this act . . ." 
Section 9567 provides for injunctive relief upon complaint 
by the board against violators of the minimum price schedules 
established by the board. 
) 
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In July, 1947, 75 per cent of those licensed by the board 
in numerous cities in Los Angeles County petitioned the 
board to establish minimum prices in both wholesale and 
retail fields. Basing its action upon its own cost surveys, 
the board established and published its minimum Price Sched-
ules. In September, 1949, the board filed a complaint charg-
ing the defendants with violations of the price schedule and 
with threats to continue to do so. The board had estab-
lished a minimum price to be paid for cleaning and pressing· 
a man's suit at $1.00. The defendant Thrift-D-Lux Cleaner 
was charging 69 cents for the iame service. 
If the statute can be sustained as constitutional it is 
because it is a reasonable exercise of the police power 
of the state. [1] Under the law generally that power ex-
tends to legislation enacted to promote the public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare. [2] It has rightly been 
said that "such [police] regulations may validly be imposed 
if they constitute a reasonable exertion of governmental au-
thority for the public good. If there is a proper legislative 
purpose, a law enacted to carry out that purpose, if not 
arbitrary nor discriminatory, must be upheld by the courts." 
(In rc Fuller (1940), 15 Ca1.2d 425, 428 [102 P.2d 321].) 
[3] Howeycr, in the exercise of the police power the law 
places limits on the discretion of the Legislature. Whether 
there has been a reasonable exercise of this power is a court 
question. 
It is first contended by the plaintiff that the price fixing 
features of the statute were designed to protect the public 
health and safety. The statutory law in California meets 
this contention head on for it has made detailed and ade-
quate provisions elsewhere for the proteetion of the public's 
health and safety through the regulation of the dry cleaning 
industry. (Chapter 2 [Fire Protection-Clothes Cleaning 
Establishments] and chapter 3 [Fire. Protection-Spotting, 
Sponging, and Pressing Establishments] of part 2, division 
12 of the Health and Safety Code; subchapter 4 [Dry Clean-
ing Equipment Employing Volatile and Inflammable Sol-
vents] and subchapter 5 [Spotting, Sponging and Pressing 
Establishments] of chapter 1 [State Fire Marshal], title 19 
[Public Safety] of the California Administrative Code; arti-
cle 6 [Laundry, Dry Cleaning, and Dyeing Industry], chap-
ter 5 [Division of Industrial Welfare], title 8 [Industrial 
Relations] of the Administrative Code; chapter 2 (Safety 
Devices and Safeguards], part 1 (W orkinen 's Safety], divi-
) 
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sion 5 [Safety in Employment] of the Labor Code.) It is 
not contended that the present statute is invalid merely be-
cause the Legislature could reach the purported objective 
through the enforcement of the provisions of the above cited 
statutes. [4] The previous enactment of these statutes fur-
nish support for the conclusion that they were designed to 
and do fully protect the public health and safety and that 
the price-fixing features of the present statute have no func-
tion to that end. On the contrary they constitute an unneces-
sary and unreasonable restriction on the pursuit of private 
and useful business activities. The asserted objective of 
those portions of the statute are not in fact their real ob-
jective. There is therefore nothing relating to the price 
charged for such services that has any real or 'SUbstantial 
relationship to the public health or safety. 
[6] The proponents of the validity of the statute would 
justify it in the light of troubled conditions which they 
claim existed prior to W orld War II, although they are ad-
verse to applying legal concepts generally accepted during 
that same period. The statute does not purport to be nor 
can it be justified as a war or emergency measure. During 
periods of emergency such as a state of war or of general 
economic distress the courts have recognized a broad legis-
lative discretion dealing with such situations in the interest 
of the public welfare. It does not appear that at the time 
this legislation was enacted there was any such general emer-
gency affecting all private businesses alike. There is nothing 
in the dry cleaning business which distinguishes it from the 
multitude of other businesses offering services to the general 
pUblic. The disturbances and violence which are said to 
have existed in the dry cleaning business during the period 
of economic stress prior to the last World War were common 
to other businesses. It is important to note that the statute 
itself in no way purports to prevent destructive and unfair 
competition or to suppress violence. 
[6] It is claimed that the price-fixing portions of the 
statute were enacted to provide for the general welfare. But 
a legislative body may not, under the guise of providing for 
this component of the police power, impose unnecessary and 
unreasonable restrictions upon the pursuit of these useful 
activities. [7] If a statute has no real or substantial rela-
tion to any legitimate police power objective, it is the duty 
_of the court to so declare. (McKay Jewelers, Inc. v. Bow-
442 STATE BOARD v. THRIFT-D-Lux CLEANERS [40 C.2d 
ron, 19 Ca1.2d 595, 600 [122 P.2d 543, 139 A.L.R. 1188].) 
[8] In this connection it is recognized that every intend-
ment will be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of 
a legislative enactment (Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11 
Ca1.2d 343 [79 P.2d 1080]), but the presumption of consti-
tutionality is not conclusive. 
The question of the validity of a price fixing law as re-
lated to tI!e general welfare was involved in the case of In 
re Herrick (1938),25 Cal.App.2d 751 [77 P.2d 262]. There 
the court declared unconstitutional an ordinance which fixed 
a minimum price for the cleaning of a man's suit of clothes. 
The declared purpose of the ordinance was "the restora-
tion and maintenance of the highest practical degree of pub-
lic welfare." The court in that case relied on the decision 
in In re Kazas (1937), 22 Cal.App.2d 161 [70 P.2d 962], 
which had declared unconstitutional an ordinance for fixing 
minimum prices for a haircut and shave. In considering 
whether legislation aims to promote the public welfare as 
a component part of the police power, the court properly 
recognized that the concept of public welfare had under-
gone a process of development through the years. Tradi-
tionally the power to legislate for the public welfare was 
not much more comprehensive than the power to legislate 
for the public health, safety and morals. In Munn v. Illi-
nois (1876), 94 U.S. 113 [24 L.Ed. 77] it was considered 
that only where a person had entered the field of public 
service in the use of his property did he consent to its regu-
lation for the public welfare. [9] In this state and else-
where it is established that at least where a business is "af-
fected with a public interest or clothed with a public use" 
it may be regulated under the general welfare concept. 
(Nebbin v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 [54 ·S.Ct.. 505, 78 L.Ed. 
940] ; Agricultural Prorate Com. v. SuperiorC01trt, 5 Cal. 
2d 550, 582 [55 P.2d 495].) In the Nebbia case a New York 
statute est.ablishing a minimum price for the milk industry 
of that state was upheld on the ground that the end sought 
was within the scope of the legislative power of the state 
to insure an adequate supply of wholesome milk for public 
consumption. 
[10] It is argued that the "affected with Ii public in-
terest" doctrine was abandoned in the Nebbia case. On the 
contrary that case may be cited merely for an interpretation 
of that doctrine. At page 536 the court stated that the 
phrase can mean "no more than that an industry, for ade-
) 
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quate reason, is subject to control for the public good." (See, 
also, Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 245-246 [61 S.Ct. 862, 
85 L.Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500].) If the phrase means only 
what the Supreme Court has said it means, then it remains 
an adequate test. It does not imply that some particular 
industries are and others are not subject to control. It means 
that where the control is for the public good any industry 
may be regulated, provided there is "adequate reason" for 
it. That" adequate reason" can only be to achieve a pur-
pose within the police power of the state. The test em-
phasizes that the control must be for the "public good." 
[11] When the "affected with a public interest" doctrine 
is applied in this sense it is an adequate and proper test. 
As it was traditionally applied to confine regulation to only 
those industries in the nature of public utilities it is admit-
tedly no longer so limited. 
[12] Regardless of the legal terminology used in defining 
the test employed, any legislation to be justified and sup-
ported by the concept of "general welfare" must aim to pro-
mote the welfare of a properly classified segment of the gen-
eral public as contrasted with that of a small percentage or 
a special class of the body politic where no such classification 
can be justified. In the Kazas case the court held that the 
ordinance legislated for the benefit of barbers alone, who 
made up 2 per cent of the community, and that the "ordi-
nance does not purport to consider the welfare of the other 
ninety-eight per cent of the population of the city nor the 
effect on them of fixing the minimum prices to be charged 
for cutting their hair or shaving their masculine faces~" It 
was also held "that on the face of the ordinance it affirma-
tively appears that the legislation was not intended to pro-
mote the general welfare of the people . . . but only a small 
group composing a very small proportion of the population. 
. . ." As further evidence that the ordinance did not con-
sider the interests of the general public, the court noted that 
the ordinance "attempted to pour all barbers and barber 
shops into a common mold, turning them out exactly alike 
regardless of skill or efficiency of operation, excellence and 
completeness of equipment, desirability of location or expense 
of conducting business." 
[13] The statute before us is not dissimilar to that con-
sidered in the Kazas case. It seeks to establish but a single 
grade of work in the dry cleaning industry and to eliminate 
the economical cleaning job. It does not take into considera-
) 
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tion the "skill or efficiency of operation, excellence and com- i 
pleteness of equipment, desirability of location or expense· 
of conducting business." It does not consider that a sub-
stantial group of the public may choose to purchase a cheaper 
grade of cleaning for particular garments, knowing that: 
they are not obtaining the quality of service offered by more 
expensive establishments. The statute does not purport to 
prevent the imposition of fraud upon the public, nor to elim-
inate destructive and unfair competition, which practices are 
adequately legislated against in the Unfair Practices .Act 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt. II, chap. IV) . .As in the Kazaa 
case, this statute would seemingly have the effect of enhancing 
the economic status of the industry and enlarging the pronts 
of each operator. The record shows that an advance in prices 
will benent less than 1 per cent of those persons who com-
prise the dry cleaning operators in Los Angeles County. 
On principle the standards here involved are indistinguishable 
from the standards considered in that case. Indeed it is argued 
that the circUnistances in that case presented an even greater 
reason for upholding the enactment; that it was decided upon 
a declared state of emergency in unemployment affecting the . 
peace and welfare of the city, and affecting an industry more 
personal in nature and therefore more subject to regulation. 
But the court concluded that "the private advantage of a 
small group, not a class, composing a small percentage of the 
population ... does not make a price fixing ordinance for 
that group alone legislation for the general welfare. • • • u 
The plaintiff seeks a reversal on the ground that since the I 
decision in the Kazas case in 1937 the judicial treatment of 
legislation dealing with an exercise of the police power has 
advanced to a point where the principles of that decision 
should not be controlling. It is particularly asserted that the 
"error in the Kazas case is the holding that in order to regu-I 
late the prices in an industry that industry must be 'clothed 
with a public use' in the old and traditional sense of that ' 
term, " However the use of the phrase was in reference only 
to the fact that the barbering business is not so "clothed 
with a public interest" that the welfare of the industry itself 
is directly related to the welfare of the public. The use 
the court made of the phrase "affected with a public in-
terest" in the Kazas case was in the same sense that the 
Olsen and the Nebbia cases (Olsen v. Nebraska, supra, 313 U.S. 
236; Nebbia v. New York, supra, 291 ,U.S. 502) had used it, 
namely, as an aid to determine when a statute provides for 
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the general welfare. This was indicated in the Kazas ease 
by a citation of the following excerpt from State v. Ives, 123 
Fla. 401 [167 So. 394] : "Such a regulation could be justified 
only upon the fact that the barber trade is a paramount in-
dustry of the state intimately connected with its welfare, so 
that the state may, through an agency such as the board of 
barber examiners, prescribe prices for the services to be 
rendered by each barber .... 
"Reduced to its last analysis, the thought underlying the 
act seems to be not that the barber trade is a paramount in-
dustry affecting the general welfare, but that the prosperity 
of the barber class sufficient to maintain the average barber 
and his family 'properly' is a sufficient reason for the exer-
cise by the state of the power of direction, control and man-
agement of the barber business. . . ." 
Although the Florida Supreme Court in a later decision 
(Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning &: Laundry 
Board (1938), 134 Fla. 1 [183 So. 759]), upheld the validity 
of a statute ,regulating prices in the dry cleaning industry, 
it reiterated its position in regard to the use of the "affected 
with a public interest" phrase as employed in its modern 
sense. The court said: "There is no magic in the phrase 
'clothed with or affected with a public interest'. Any business 
is affected by a public interest when it reaches such propor-
tions that the interest of the public demands that it be reason-
ably regulated to conserve the rights of the pUblic. . .. " This 
statement of the doctrine is in accord with Its application in 
the Kazas case. If it may be said that the Florida court in the 
Miami Laundry Co. case abandoned its position in the I ves 
case it apparently 'did so on the theory that the Supreme 
Court of the United States had, in the Nebbia case, thrown 
open to price regulation all lines of business legislatively de-
clared to be affected with the public interest and therefore 
subject to price control. The able dissenting opinions in the 
Miami Laundry Company case would seem to be clearly in 
accordance with the weight of authority. 
Returning to the Kazas case it must be said that it correctly 
employed the "affected with a public interest" phrase in the 
same manner as that phrase was employed in the Nebbia case 
three years earlier. Because of the closeness of the milk in-
dustry to the public health the Supreme Court saw fit to 
classify it as "affected with a public interest," or subject 
to price regulation for the public good. But it does not follow 
that all other businesses in which the public is served should 
) 
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fall within the same classification. If they do there is no limit 
which the Legislature is bound to respect and all businesses 
are subject to its uncontrolled power to fix prices. 
The doctrine of the Kazas case has been followed in other 
jurisdictions. (Kent Stores v. Wilentz, 14 F.Supp. 1; Becker 
v. State, 7 Harr. 454 [185 A. 92] ; Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala. 
622 [173 So. 266, 111 A.L.R. 349].) The most recent deci-
sion declaring unconstitutional a minimum price statute 
similar to the present case was announced by the Supreme 
Court of Oregon on April 2, 1952. In Christian v. La Forge, 
194 Ore. 450 [242 P.2d 797], that court declared that 
"perhaps the best discussion of the subject is to be found 
in In re Kazas, supra." The Oregon court quoted at great 
length from that opinion and declared invalid the statute 
before it on the same reasoning. Additional decisions in other 
states which have expressly followed the Kazas case are 
the following: Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners 
(1951), 72 Ariz. 108 [231 P.2d 450] ; Revne v. Trade Com. 
(1948), 113 Utah 155 [192 P.2d 563, 3 A.L.R.2d 169] ; State 
Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud (1942), 220 Ind. 552 
[44 N.E.2d 972]. The case is recognized as a leading au-
thority by the highest courts of sister states and receives 
the approval of this court. Seeking its disapproval the plain- ' 
tiff states that the decision in the case of In re Lasswell, 1 
Cal.App.2d 183 [36 P.2d 678], has been completely ignored. 
That case upheld the constitutionality of the California In-
dustrial Recovery Act, and particularly held that provisions 
fixing minimum prices in the dry cleaning industry were 
valid. The decision in that case has been properly "ignored. 
The California Industrial Recovery Act was legislation 
enacted to supplement the National Industrial. Recovery Act 
of 1933, and in effect adopted the federal statute to extend 
its application to intrastate commerce. In effect the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 [55 S.Ct. 837, 97 A.L.R. 947], 
overruled 111 "e Lasswell and rendered inoperative the Cali-
fornia price fixing statute. The Lasswell decision cannot 
therefore be relied upon as authority for the validity of the 
price fixing provisions of the present statute. 
In Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy 
d': Tobacco Co. (1938), 11 Ca1.2d 634 [82 P.2d 3, 118 
A.L.R. 486]. this court sustained the Unfair Practices Act. 
The court there held that the purpose of the act was the 
prevention of destructive competition and injury to com-
') 
} 
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petitors. That is a legitimate objective in the interest of the 
general welfare, and on this basis is distinguishable from 
the present statute. 
In Jersey Maid Milk J>f·oducts 00. v. Brock (1939), 13 
Ca1.2d 620 [91 P.2d 577], this court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Milk Stabilization Act (Agr. Code, chap. 10, 
div. IV), involving the regulations including the fixing of 
minimum prices in the sale of fluid milk. The statute there 
under consideration is clearly distinguishable from the present 
one on the same basis as is N ebbw v. N ew York (1934), supra, 
291 U.S. 502. There as before stated it was held that there 
is a public need for a constant supply of pure, wholesome 
milk; that the milk industry concerns not only the economic 
welfare but the health of the public in general, and legisla-
tion which aims to protect that general welfare through an 
initial protection of an industry is within the scope of the 
police power. The e1Iect of the statute here involved is to 
protect the industry only-a small segment of the general 
public. On this same ground, the decision in Agricultural 
Prorate Com. v. Superior Oov.rt (1936), supra, 5 Cal.2d 550 
is not in point. 
In Max Factor &; 00. v. Kunsman, 5 Ca1.2d 446 [55 P.2d 
177], the validity of the Fair Trade Act was upheld. That 
act does not involve alone the question of legislative au-
thority in the field of price regulation. It is an act to enforce 
contracts, express or implied, between vendors and vendees 
in which they agree to maintain specified standards of prices 
upon trade-marked commodities. Although the retail~r in 
that case had not expressly been a party to the agreement, 
nevertheless a majority of the court held that an agreement 
to sell at the fixed price was implied when that retailer 
ordered goods which he knew or should have known were 
fair trade items. The court stated at page .64: •• The statute 
. . . is aimed at protecting these valuable property and eon-. 
tract rights of the manufacturer or producer-rights just as 
valuable and just as much entitled to protection as the right 
of the retailer, who is attempting, by exercising his claimed 
right of freedom of action, to injure the property and con-
tract rights of the manufacturer or producer. The statute, 
in other words, does not merely prohibit price-cutting in order 
to regulate prices, but prohibits price-cutting in an attempt 
to protect the validly acquired rights of others." The Max 
Factor case affords no support for the plaint.iff's position. 
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It must be concluded that the price fixing prOVlSlon 
of the statute here involved is invalid because it is not, by 
any recognized or recognizable standard, an enactment pro-
viding for the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
The defendant points to another ground upon which the 
invalidity of the statute may well be based. Section 9564 
of the code requires that the •• board shall investigate and 
ascertain those minimum prices which will enable cleaners, 
dyers, or pressers in that ... area to furnish modern, proper, 
healthful and sanitary services, using such appliances and , 
equipment as will minimize the danger to public health and 
safety incident to such services." The only other reference 
to an established standard is in section 9566 as follows: 
"At the conclusion of an investigation therefor, the board 
may establish a reasonable and just minimum price schedule I 
conforming to the requirements of this article." [14] While 
the delegation of governmental authority to an administrative 
body is proper in some instances, the delegation of absolute 
legislative discretion is not. To avoid such a result it is 
necessary that a delegating statute establish an ascertainable· 
standard to guide the administrative body. [15] Here the 
statute assumes to confer legislative authority upon those 
who are directly interested in the operation of the regulatory 
rule and its penal provisions with no guide for the exercise 
of the delegated authority. The board is made up of six 
active members of the industry, and one member of the public 
at large. The initiation of the proposed control is at the 
insistence of 75 per cent of the tlleaners in the area. In de-
claring invalid the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 
1935, the United States Supreme Court stated: c'. . . one 
person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the 
business of another, and especially of a competitor. And a 
statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an 
intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal 
liberty and private property. The delegation is so clearly 
arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is 
unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this court 
which foreclose the question." (Carter v. Carter Caol Co., 
298 U.S. 238, 311 [56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160].) 
In Becker v. State, supra, 7 Harr. 454, the Supreme Court 
of Delaware set aside the Delaware Dry Cleaning Law. It 
stated that •• vast authority is centered in a governing board, 
a majority of which are directly interested in the industry, 
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but who, nevertheless are empowered to act in a judicial 
capacity, and to sit in judgment over fellow members of the 
trade. Too great a strain is imposed upon human frailty. The 
practical tendency of the legislation is to create and foster 
monopoly, to prevent, not to encourage, competition, to main-
tain maximum, not minimum prices, all of which is against, 
-not in aid of, the interests of a consuming public." 
Where the Legislature attempts to delegate its powers to 
an administrative board made up of interested members of 
the industry, the majority of which can initiate regulatory 
action by the board in that industry, that delegation may 
well be brought into question. . 
From the foregoing it follows that the price fixing provisions 
of the statute under attack .must fall on the constitutional 
grounds stated, and that the demurrer was properly sustained. 
The judgment is affirmed. . 
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In my opinion the minimum price pro-
visions of the Dry Cleaners' Act of 1945 do not violate the due 
process clause of either the United States Constitution or the 
California Constitution. 
The'Legislature has power to determine the rights of per-
sons, subject only to the limitations of the United States Con-
stitution and the California Constitution. (Modern Barber 
Colleges, Inc. v. California Emp. S!ab. Com., 31 Cal.2d 720, 
726 [192 P.2d 916] ; Delaney v. -Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561, 568 
1I54 P.2d 674} ; Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912, 916 [152 P.2d 
169].) A statute regulating commercial transactions does not 
violate the due process clause of either Constitution unless it is 
proved so unreasonable as to dispel the presumption that it 
rests upon some rational basis within the 'knowledge and 
experience of the legislators. (Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 
246 [61 8.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305, 133 A.L;R. 1500]; United 
states v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 [58 S.Ct. 
778, 82 L.Ed. 1234]; Sertle Yourself Gas. etc. Assn. v. 
Brock, 39 Ca1.2d 813, 817 [249 P.2.d 545] ; In re Fuller, 15 
Ca1.2d 425, 428 [102 P.2d 321] ; Jersey Maid Milk Products 
Co. v. Brock, ]3 Ca1.2d 620, 636 [91 P.2d 577] ; Wholesale 
Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy &7 Tobacco Co., 
11 Ca1.2d 634, 643 [82 P.2d 3, 118 A.L.R. 486].) Judicial 
inquiry uwhere the legislative judgment is drawn into ques-
.0 c.1d-I1 
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tion, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts 
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords 
support for it." (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
supra, 304 U.S. 144, 154.) The statute in the present case, 
like any other regulation of private enterprise, must be con-
sidered in this light. 
Although early decisions held that prices could not be regu-
lated unless the industry was clothed with a public interest 
(see Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 [48 8.0t. 454, 72 L.Ed. 
913]), the United States Supreme Oourt discarded that test in 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-539 [54 8.0t. 505, 78 
L.Ed. 940]. (See, also, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 [57 8.0t. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330].) In 
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 [61 8.0t. 862, 85 L.Ed. 
1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500], the court in a unanimous opinion 
overruled the Ribnik case and refused to inquire into the 
wisdom of the challenged legislation. The Olsen decision re-
versed the decision of the state court, 138 Neb. 574 [293 N.W. 
393], holding the price-fixing statute in question unconstitu-
tional. This court soon followed the lead of the United States 
Supreme Court. (Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. Na-
tional Candy & Tobacco Co., supra, 11 Oal.2d 634, 655.) The 
Legislature, therefore, is clearly empowered to prevent de- . 
structive price cutting, which has demoralizing effects on busi-
ness itself and on its service to the public. 
The dry cleaning industry has ~ unhappy history of ruth-
less competition marked by destructive price cutting and re-
taliatory sabotage. Early attempts at voluntary price regu-
lation by internal agreements were struck down by the courts .. 
(Endicott v. Rosenthal (1932), 216 Cal. 721 [16 P.2d 673] ; 
see, also, In re Herrick (1938), 25 Oal.App.2d 751 [77 P.2d 
262] ). Thereafter, price cutting was fought by sabotage. 
The chaotic state of the industry was brought to light in 
People v. Cowan (1940), 38 Oal.App.2d 231 [101 P.2d 125], 
a murder prosecution arising out of an attempt to sabotage a 
dry cleaner who cut his prices, and in People v. Black (1941), 
45 Cal.App.2d 87 [113 P.2d 746], a prosecution for conspiracy 
to commit sabotage by placing metallic potassium in gar-
ments sent to a price cutter. It was there revealed that a 
substantial number of industry members were guilty of un-
lawful attacks on retailers who cut prices. The industry 
thereafter, from 1941-1945, achieved stabilization under price 
regulation by the Office of Price Administration. After the 
cessation of O.P.A. regulation, the statute now held un-
,) 
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constitutional was passed by unanimous vote of both houses 
of the Legislature and signed by the Governor. 
The dry cleaning business is highly vulnerable to price 
wars and their attendant evils. The industry represents mil-
lions of dollars in plants and equipment and requires the 
labor of thousands of skilled workers. It is subject to intense 
short-period fluctuations. The dry cleaner cannot hedge 
against these fluctuations by stock-piling inventory or by 
large-scale buying of raw materials. He cannot supply his 
market in advance, layoff help, and wait for demand to catch 
up with supply as a manufacturer ordinarily can. A dry 
cleaner is under constant pressure to cut his prices, increase 
his volume, and reduce his costs. Other cleaners follow suit 
and the price cuts inevitably result in downgrading of service. 
The cleaning industry is particularly susceptible to down-
grading: its processes are highly specialized and it is diffi-
cult to police against slipshod performance or to detect it. 
Destructive price cutting quickly starts a vicious train of 
sabotage, violence, eventual bankruptcy for many cleaners, 
and disruption of a service industry essential to the public 
health .. 
The statute sets the minimum price schedule as low as is 
consistent with efficient and sanitary service. (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 9564.) Prices can be fixed only after a cost survey 
and due investigation by the board. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 9564-9566.) If the board should abuse the discretion vested 
in it, its action is subject to judicial correction.· (Gov. Code, 
§ 11440.) The statute thus limits the 'competitive struggle in 
the industry to the quality of service offered to the public. 
The Legislature could reasonably conclude that the eco-
nomic waste, the loss of propertY, the violation of law, the 
threat to health and public convenience, could be prevented 
by elimination of price warfare through establishment of mini-
mum price schedules. It could reasonably conclude that a 
measure of economic security would encourage compliance 
with health and safety regulations and the maintenance of 
the industry's capacity to meet the fluctuating demand of the 
public at reasonable prices. 
Disruption of business by destructive competition has long 
been recognized as an evil that may be. controlled by the 
Legislature. Thus in Max Factor & 00. v. Kunsman, 5 Ca1.2d 
*Defendants contend only that the statute is unconstitutional &I a 
whole. No claim is made that the particular price aehedulea :fixed by the 
board are unauthorized by the statute. 
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446 [55 P.2d 177], affirmed, 299 U.S. 198 [57 8. Ct. 147, "si : 
L.Ed. 122], this court held constitutional a statute requiring 
retailers to sell products at a price fixed by the wholesaler. 
The court said: "In the first place, this court has neither 
the power nor the duty to determine the wisdom of any 
economic policy; that function rests solely with the legisla-
ture. We recognize that economic and juridical thought is, 
and for many years has been, divided on the economic ques-
tion as to the benefits to the consuming public of free and 
open competition, and its necessary corollary, price-cutting. 
. . . The members of this court mayor may not agree with 
the economic philosophy of the Fair Trade Act, but it is no 
part of the duty of this court to determine whether the 
policy embodied in the statute is wise or unwise." (5 Ca1.2d 
at 454-455.) The majority opinion would distinguish the 
Max Factor case on the ground that the only question there 
decided was the right to enforce "implied" contracts be-
tween vendors and vendees who "should have known" that 
certain goods were fair trade items. The distinction is un-
tenable. The retailer in the Max Factor case had not at any 
time agreed to sell at the fixed price and was being compened 
by the court to abide by the price determined by the whole-
saler. A statute requiring a nonsigning retailer to sell at 
a fixed price under penalty of an injunction is as much 
a price fixing statute as is the statute in the present case. 
The Max Factor case is clear authority for the proposition 
that the Legislature may enact price fixing legislation, if it ~ 
determines that price cutting will adversely affect a particular 
industry to the detriment of the public. In other cases also 
this court has approved price regulation. (Jersey Maid Milk 
Products 00. v. Brock, cSupra; Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. 
National etc. 00., supra; see, also, 1"" I"e WiUing, 12 Cal.2d 
591, 594 [86 P.2d 663].) The majority opinion would dis-
tinguish the Jersey Maid case on the ground that low milk 
prices affect the general public, which·· needs a supply of 
pure milk, but that dry cleaning prices protect only the 
industry. Unless this court intends to return to the "clothed 
with a public interest" test, I see no basis for the proposed 
distinction of the Jersey Maid case. The question of the 
need of the legislation in a partiCUlar industry is one for 
the Legislature; this court is not equipped to determine which 
industries should receive price protection in the public in-
terest and which should not. The majority opinion would 
distinguish the Wholesale Tobacco case on the ground that 
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the legislation in that case was designed to prevent destructive 
competition, a proper legislative objective. The same objec-
tive underlies the statute in the present case. 
The majority opinion holds that this case is governed by 
In re Kazas (1937),22 Cal.App.2d 161 [70 P.2d 962], rather 
than by the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
The Kazas case, however, turned on the question whether 
the barber trade was "affected with a public interest," a 
standard long since discarded by the United States Supreme 
Court and by this court. (Olsen v. Nebraska, supra; Whole-
sale Tobacco Dealers v. National etc. Co., supra.) Moreover, 
the Kazas case relied upon State v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401 [167 
So. 394], a case subsequently abandoned by the court that 
decided it. (Miami Laundry 00. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & 
Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 54 [183 So. 759].) I would dis-
approve the Kazas case as clearly contrary to presently 
accepted principles of constitutional law. 
It is contended that the Dry Cleaners' Act of 1945 could 
not have the objective of protecting the public health and 
safety because the Legislature could reach that· objective by 
enforcement of provisions of the Health and Safety Code 
and of the Unfair Practices Act. This reasoning proceeds 
from a misconception of this court's function in passing 
upon the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. The 
only question before us is whether there is a rational basis 
for the statute. Questions regarding the wisdom of the legis-
lation are irrelevant. (Olsen v. Nebraska, supra, 313 U.S. 
at p. 246.) It was for the Legislature to determine whether 
additional legislation was necessary to preclude conditions in 
the dry Cleaning industry that would adversely affect the 
public welfare. An attack on a statute cannot be justified 
by an assumption that there are wiser methods of reaching 
the desired objective. (Hunter v. JlI,stice's Oourt, 36 Ca1.2d 
315,319 [223 P.2d 465].) 
A number of decisions from other states have held con-
stitutional the regulation of prices in the dry cleaning and 
barber industries. (Miami Laundry v. Florida Dry Oleaning 
Board, supra; People v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1 [87 P.2d 755] ; 
State Dry Cleaners' Board v. Oompton, 201 Okla. 284 [205 
P.2d 286] ; Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 
57 [109 P.2d 779] ; Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 
190 La. 214, 266 [182 So. 485]; State v. McMasters, 204 
Minn. 438 [283 N.W. 767] ; 119 A.L.R. 1481; 111 A.L.R. 353.) 
The reasoning of the court in the Arnold case is typical of 
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the foregoing decisions: "The record before us discloses the 
hazards to the health of that large portion of the public 
which patronizes barber shops, in the price cutting com-
petition which prevails, absent regulation and fixing of the 
minimum to be charged. The sanitary requirements set up 
by earlier act of 1935 (Chap. 111, Laws 1935), appellant 
urges, are in themselves sufficient to insure health protection 
and sanitary working conditions. But the record before us 
offers support to appellees' contention that in price wars 
and where non-profitable charges are made for barbers' serv-
ices, the sanitary safeguards are uniformly sacrificed. This 
was the situation which we have a right to assume the legisla-
ture intended to correct. . . . We recognize Ex parte Kazas, 
22 Cal.App.2d 161 [70 P.2d 962], relied upon by appellant, 
as authority opposing the constitutionality of a statute simi-
lar to our own. It is clearly opposed to the authority relied 
upon by appellees and to much we have here said. It is 
quite obvious also that the California court took its position 
in that case notwithstanding the changed doctrine announced 
and followed in the Nebbia and West Coast Hotel Company 
cases, supra. We pass further consideration of this case, 
however, with the observation that in our opinion, it is con-
trary to the weight of recent authority and the better reasoned 
decisions, as is also other authority relied upon by appellant." 
(109 P.2d at 785-786.) 
Most of the cases holding statutes regulating dry cleaning 
and barber prices unconstitutional were decided in 1937 or 
earlier, before the decision in West Ooast Hotel v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379 [57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330] . 
. Thus, State v. Ives, supra, 123 Fla. 401, quoted· at length 
in the majority opinion, was decided upon authority of 
Adkins v. Ohildren's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 [43 8. Ct. 
394, 67 L.Ed. 785], expressly overruled in the West Coast,' 
Hotel case. As previously pointed out, the Florida Supreme '\ 
Court has abandoned its position in State v. Ives. Again, 1 
the majority opinion relies on Oity of Mobile v. Rouse (1937), 
27 Ala.App. 344 [173 So. 254.] That decision was cited as 
controlling by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Board of 
Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214 [182 So. 485]. 
Before the decision in the Parker case became final, the 
United States Supreme Court filed its opinion in the West 
Coast Hotel case. The Louisiana court thereupon granted a 
rehearing, reversed its earlier decision relying on the Rouse 
case, and held the barber statute constitutional. (190 La. 
) 
) 
Mar. 1953] STATE BOARD v. TBRIFT·D·Lux CLEANERS 455 
[40 C.1d 436; 254 P.Jd ZII] 
266 (182 So. 485].) Another case cited by the majority, 
Becker v. State (1936), 37 Del. 454 (185 A. 92], was also 
decided before the recent United States Supreme Court cases. 
It is true that several recent cases support the majority 
opmIOn. (Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450 [242 P.2d 
797] ; Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156 [161 S.W.2d 189] ; State 
v. Greeson, "174 Tenn. 178 [124 S.W.2d 253]; State Board 
of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552 [44 N.E.2d 972] ; 
Edwards v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108 
[231 P.2d 450].) The Greeson, Cloud, and Edwards cases 
expressly relied upon Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
[25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937]. The United State Supreme 
Court, however, no longer adheres to the constitutional 
doctrine expressed in the Lochner and similar cases, such 
as Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 [28 S.Ct. 277, 5 L.Ed. 
436] ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 [17 s.Ot. 427, 41 
L.Ed. 832] ; and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 [35 S.Ct. 240, 
59 L.Ed 441]. "This Court beginning at least as early as 
1934, when the Nebbia case was decided, has steadily reo 
jected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair· 
Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously returned 
closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that 
states have power to legislate against what are found to be 
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business 
affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific 
federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal 
law. See Nebbia v. New York, supra, at 523·524, and West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, at 392.395, and cases cited. 
Under this constitutional doctrine the due process clause 
is no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress 
and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they 
attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which 
they regard as offensive to the public welfare." (Lincoln 
Union v. Northwestern Iron &- Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 
536.537, 542, 557 [59 S.Ct. 251, 260, 267, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 
A.L.R.2d 473].) In view of the Nebbia, West Coast Hotel, 
and Olsen cases, and the decisions of this court in the Jersey 
Maid and Max Factor cases, I cannot regard as controlling 
the decisions from other states holding similar legislation 
unconstitutional. 
As an alternative ground of decision, the majority opinion 
st.ates that the Dry Cleaners' Act "may well be" unconsti. 
tutional because it "assumes to confer legislative authority 
upon those who are directly interested in the operation of 
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the regulatory rule and its penal provisions with no guide 
for the exercise of the delegated authority." 
The members of the State Board of Dry Cleaners are ap-
pointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate. They 
are officials of the state, paid by the state for administering 
the law, and their acts are reviewed by the judiciary. The 
fact that six members of the board must be members of the 
cleaning industry has no constitutional significance. (See 
Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 414 [77 P. 166, 66 L.R.A. 
249 J [Board of Medical Examiners elected by members 
of regulated professionJ ; Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry 
Cleaning &7 Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 13 [183 So. 759, 764, 
119 A.L.R. 956J; see, also, Davis, Administrative Law, pp. 
380-381.) It may be debatable whether the manifest advan-
tages of submitting highly technical problems to an informed 
tribunal are outweighed by the possible danger that an agency 
largely composed of members representing an interested eco-
nomic group may be tempted to act for selfish ends. The 
Legislature is free to make its choice. (See Opp Cotton Mills 
v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126, 144 
[61 8.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 624].) 
The fact that price regulation is initiated at the insistence 
of 75 per cent of the cleaners in the area does not present 
constitutional difficulties. Whatever their special interest in 
articulating the problem, it remains a general one, of the 
greatest concern to the public. Governmental processes are 
commonly set in motion by the petition, complaint, or other 
action by some individual or group: Thus, the Administra-
tive Procedure Act provides that" Except where the right to 
petition for adoption of a regulation is restricted by statute 
to a designated group ... any interested person may peti-
tion a state agency requesting the adoption or repeal of a 
regulation .... [A] state agency shall within 30 days deny 
the petition in writing or schedule the·· matter for public 
hearing." (Gov. Code, §§ 11426-11427.) In Agricultural 
Prorate Com. v. Superior Court, 5 Ca1.2d 550, 554, 586-587 
[55 P.2d 495], this court upheld a statute providing that the 
details and area of a proration program be determined by 
the filing of a petition signed by two-thirds of the producers 
in the area. We rejected there a contention that apparently 
is accepted in the majority opinion: that the delegation of 
power to the industry to initiate action invalidated the stat-
ute. In Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 
620, 645 [91 P.2d 577], we upheld a requirement that 65 
) 
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per cent of the producers in the regulated industry decide 
that a stabilization plan should be formulated. (See, also, 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 [63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 
315] [upholding the statute involved in Agricultural Prorate 
Com. v. Superior Court, supra] j Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 
1, 15-16 [59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441] j Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. 
2<1 2i;), 28!i-28i l]01 P.2d 665] j Davis, Administrative Law, 
pp.71-73.) 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 [56 S.Ct. 855, 80 
L.Ed. 1160], is not applicable here. In that case, the prices 
were fixed by private persons in the industry. The present 
case is analogous to Sunshine A. Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 
381, 399 [60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263], where the United 
States Supreme Court held the Carter case not controlling 
and upheld a statutory plan for coal price fixing by which 
district boards of code members proposed minimum prices, 
which became effective upon approval by the agency. (See, 
also, United States'v. Rock Royal Co-Op., 307 U.S. 533, 577-
578 [59 8.Ct. 993, 83 'L.Ed. 1446] j Jaffe, Law Making by 
Private Groups, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 201.) 
In Revfie v. Trade Com., 113 Utah 155 [192 P.2d 563, 3 
A.L.R.2d 169], it was held that the Utah Legislature had un- , 
lawfully delegated to the barber industry the power to fix 
minimum prices by agreement. That decision, however, is 
clearly distinguishable. The Utah court said: "We recog-
'nize, of course, that the legislature may properly delegate 
to some administrative body the duty of ascertaining the 
facts upon which the provisions of a law are to function, and 
also, that one of the methods of initiating activity on the part 
of that administrative body may be by petition of the citizens 
concerned. Such procedure is not in and of itself defective 
as an improper delegation of legislative authority. The ques-
tion of an improper delegation of legiSlative authority lies 
embedded in the extent of the power granted to the admin-
istrative body." (192 P.2d at 567.) The court held the 
Utah statute invalid on the ground that price schedules were 
initiated by the members of the regulated industry. The 
board could not fix prices upon its own initiative j it could 
only accept or reject the prices suggested by the industry. 
In contrast, under the Dry Cleaners' Act the board fixes the 
prices under the standards set forth in sections 9564 to 9566, 
and the industry has to accept the prices so fixed. Seventy-
five per cent of the i,ndustry petitions the board 'to fix 8 
price j the industry does not fix the price. 
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The provision in the present statute does no. more than 
relieve the board from making an expensive survey at the 
instance of a few cleaners, and allows it to act only when 
the need for regulation is apparent to a substantial number 
of those who would be affected. Far from unlawfully dele-
gating authority, the Legislature has merely restricted its 
regulations by withholding their operation from a given 
area until 75 per cent of the cleaners favor it. (See Currin v. 
Wallace, supra, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16.) 
The majority opinion states that the standards of the stat-
ute are an inadequate guide for exercise of the delegated au-
thority. The challenged provision provides that the board 
"shall investigate and ascertain those minimum prices which 
will enable cleaners, dyers, or pressers in that . . . area to 
furnish modern, proper, healthful and sanitary services, using 
such appliances and equipment as will minimize the danger 
to public health and safety incident to such services. . . . At 
the conclusion of an investigation thereofr the board may es-
tablish a reasonable and just minimum price schedule con-
forming to the requirements of this article." (§§ 9564, 9566.) 
Standards similar to those set forth in foregoing sections of 
the Dry Cleaners' Act have been repeatedly upheld by this 
court (Ray v. Parker, supra, 15 Ca1.2d 275, 286-287; Jersey 
Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, supra, 13 Cal.2d 620, 645; 
Agricultural Prorate Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.2d 
550, 586-587; Nelson v. Dean, 27 Ca1.2d873, 881 [168 P.2d 
16, 168 A.L.R. 467]) and by the United States Supreme 
Court. (American Power & L. Co. v. Securities & Ezck .. 
Com., 329 U.S. 90, 104-106 [67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103]; , 
Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130 [45 S.Ct. 34, 69· 
L.Ed. 202]; Federal Radio Com. v. NelsO'l/, Bros. BO'nd &; 
Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 [53 S.Ct. 627, 77 L.Ed. 1166, 89 
A.L.R. 406].) Minutely defined standards are not required 
when, as here, flexibility is desirable. The Legislature can-
not and need not anticipate every situation that might arise 
and supply a rule for each situation. (See Hampton & Co. 
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407-408 [48 S.Ct. 348, 72 
L.Ed. 624].) In the present case, the Legislature has plainly 
stated the legislative objective and has established standards 
adequate to guide the administrative determination of the 
particular prices that should be fixed to carry out that ob-
jective. (See American Power &; L. Co. v. Securities & Ezch. 
Com., supra.) 
The real basis for the result reached by the majority opinion 
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is an adherence to an economic view that minimum price legis-
lation is not in the best interests of the general pUblic. But 
as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, the economic and 
moral beliefs of the judiciary are not embedded in the Con-
stitution. There is no reason to suppose that judges are bet-
ter qualified than legislators to determine what social and 
economic programs should be adopted by the State of Cali-
fornia. 
I would reverse the judgment on the ground that plaintiff 
has stated a cause of action under a valid statute. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
